An offer they couldn't refuse (but probably should have):the ineffectiveness of Italian state subsidies to movie-making by Teti, Emanuele et al.
1 
An Offer They Couldn’t Refuse (But Probably Should Have):  
The Ineffectiveness of Italian State Subsidies to Moviemaking 
Summary 
Public financial support to national film production is typically conditional on very subjective 
artistic and socio-cultural criteria and objectives. Yet the question remains as to whether state 
subsidies actually help films at the box office. The results of this study suggests that the public 
grant regime was clearly not able to assure the development of the industry as intended, since in an 
overwhelming number of cases, production losses exceeded subsidy. Specific institutional and 
political features characterizing the Italian system are also contended to compound problems. 
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Introduction
Do state subsidies help films at the box office? The Italian State along with other European 
countries continues to provide public financial support for their film industries, as well as other 
traditional industries (Aydin, 2007; Brandt and Svendsen, 2009). Bagella and Becchetti (1999: 238) 
set out five criteria for justifying this expenditure, all conditional on ‘works of art’ criteria. Their 
study uses data drawn from the Italian trade journal Gazzetta del Cinema. They investigated the 
box-office returns for the period 1985 to 1996, during which time they found that once account had 
been taken of the lower reputations of the talent employed ‘…subsidized films do not have a 
significantly lower performance …in terms of total admissions, daily revenues and prescreen daily 
admissions’ (p. 246).  This finding stands in stark contrast to the findings of this study. For the later 
period 1995 to 2003 evidence is produced to show that only three of the 135 films in our dataset 
that received the State subsidy would have covered their production costs in the absence of the 
subsidy, with a further 14 films having their production costs covered through the subsidy they 
received, and thus leaving the bulk of films extremely unprofitable.  
The measure of performance used by Bagella and Becchetti is end-of-run box-office revenue 
generated in the Italian market. However, while revenue is an indicator of film popularity, it does 
not in truth, adequately reflect the resources embodied in film production and hence reflect 
alternative uses to which those resources could be put. Their argument concerning the subsidy 
seems to boil down to the counterfactual: had more recognized talent been employed in those 
subsidized films, their box-office performance would not have been significantly different from 
those Italian films that were not subsidised.  This does not concord with the findings of this study, 
since we would expect lesser talent to be paid less than major talent, thus lowering the relative costs 
of production of subsidized films, meaning that the revenues necessary to cover those costs need not 
be so high. However, we find that the average revenue performance of subsidised films in relation 
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to costs of production was very poor indeed, questioning the efficacy of the Italian film subsidy 
regime.  
It is shown that the effect of film subsidy between 1995 and 2003 was largely to misallocate 
resources, demonstrated by the simple fact that Italian moviegoers showed very little interest in the 
resulting films. At the same time the subsidised films seemed to contribute little positively to the 
prestige of Italian cinema, an avowed intention of the legislation establishing the subsidy regime. 
The paper is structured as follows. Some theoretical considerations and key influential work is 
briefly set out in the next section. This is followed by some background explaining the operation of 
the subsidy regime in Italy in the years 1997-2003, and subsequent changes made in 2004. The 
subsequent section explains the dataset and methods used in the paper and raises some data issues. 
Section 5 presents the results and is followed by a discussion and some concluding remarks. 
Film subsidies: A brief contextual retrospect 
Film projects may be awarded direct subsidies ex ante, or on an ongoing basis on completion of 
various project milestones (as in South Africa), or entirely ex post, to the producer or ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ that forms the temporary commercial entity linked to a specific film. They may 
also gain indirect subsidies awarded by Government to a third party institution (private or quasi-
public) as in the UK, that then channel funding by various decision criteria. While there is an 
extensive literature exploring the determinants of box office revenue and film success (See the 
surveys of Hadida (2009), McKenzie (2012)), the role of state subsidies in supporting films at the 
box office is given little attention. An exception is the performance comparison of subsidised and 
unsubsidised Italian films conducted by Bagella and Becchetti (1999). They stressed the need to 
take account of disparities in the fame and reputation of the cast in such box office comparisons, in 
order to consider subsidised film on an equal basis with unsubsidised film. Arguably, there could 
also be some  implicit understanding that subsidies are simply not intended to help box office but 
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are more instrumentally used merely to help pursue other objectives such as industry development 
and to help retain the capability of film making in a given country for political reasons. They may 
even be awarded just to ensure some national entries in particular film festivals. Yet such an 
ordering of priorities does not seem to be clearly set out in the Italian and other national contexts.  
Reasons for inefficiency in the subsidy allocation system can find their roots in the work of Tullock 
(1965), Downs (1967), Niskanen (1975) and many other public policy commentators (Grampp, 
1986; Austen-Smith, 1994). While the stated objective of public fund allocation lies in the social 
and cultural policies followed by states and administrations and “rent-seeking” (Grampp, 1989), the 
increase in discretionary budget to maximise the quantity of services and products offered could be 
justified only while the deadweight loss is exceeded by the benefits extracted by consumers 
(Olszewski and Rosenthal, 2004). Needless to say, such guidance is not usually followed. Instead, 
following Niskanen (1975), biases and inefficiency in budget allocation may be explained by two 
main elements. First, bureaucrats aim to expand budgets to increase their influence, role and their 
perceived ‘sensation’ of wealth and authority. Accordingly, budget maximisation is simply a tool 
rather than goal and thus working to the detriment of the national public debt. Second, a sort of 
bilateral monopoly is established between politicians and bureaucrats, giving bureaucrats a status 
similar to a monopoly organization. Further, once the funds are assigned, politicians do not have 
specific instruments or information flows to assess the way the budget is then assigned to the 
subisidised products, making the allocation procedure even more contentious (McKay 2011).   
The main effect of these concerns is that the intrinsic characteristics of bureaucrats provides a driver 
towards oversized budgets, irrespective of the specific financial need to pursue the objective to 
which the funds are actually allocated for (Acemoglu,  2001; Easterly, 2002). Inefficiency in budget 
allocation procedures can be viewed as being sustained by a lack of political authority and 
responsiveness serving as the main causes of the budget allocation distortions (Downs 1967) and 
5 
also by public organizations having a primary aim to expand rather than to specifically follow the 
objectives for which they are established (Tullock, 1965). Miller is supportive of this collection of 
findings, emphasising that allocation inefficiency is strictly related to bureaucratic incompetence 
and natural inertia. He draws specific attention to the “self-interested choices of political actors”
(Miller, 1997: 1195).   
The above body of work has been influential in policy analysis and discussions and could be 
deemed to have discernibly and positively affected government action in English-speaking 
countries well before the year 2000 with the implementation of various new reforms aimed at 
reducing bureaucratic inefficiency arising form budget allocation (Aucoin, 1991). Arguably, 
however, the same strength of influence had not yet reached Continental European countries and 
Italy, in particular. The findings of this study seem to illustrate one high profile policy context over 
a period of time, in which even an elementary level of public policy thinking did not seem to 
become manifest and yield even a modicum of concern over the budget allocation process and its 
attendant level of efficiency and inherent policy biases.  
Film production subsidies in Italy 
In 1965, the Italian State recognised the film industry as having cultural, economic and social 
importance.1  In more recent times, the regulatory framework which has governed the relations 
between the State and the Italian film industry, along with other performing arts, is based upon Law 
no.163, dated 30th April 1985. The Law established the FUS (Fondo Unico per lo Spettacolo – 
Performing Arts Fund) as the exclusive legal institution responsible for financing different artistic 
and cultural activities, including cinema, music, dance, theatre and drama, and circus arts. Over the 
years, the proportion of funds allocated by the FUS to the various arts sectors has changed from 
time to time, with the most recent Ministerial Decree allocating 47.5 per cent to opera and lyric 
1 Law no. 1213, dated 4 November 1965. 
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performance; 18.5 per cent to cinema; 16.3 per cent to theatre; 13.7 per cent to music; 2.3 per cent 
to dance; and 0.2 per cent to circus arts and travelling shows.2
The 1965 law was followed in 1994 by Law No.153, subsequently amended in 2004/5, in which the 
distinction was made between films that were of ‘national cultural interest’, and films that were 
‘nationally produced’, establishing different financial regimes for each.3 Under this Law, a newly 
formed Advisory Committee for Cinema  could declare a film to be of ‘national cultural interest’, if 
its conception together with screenplay satisfied particular cultural criteria, set down in Table 1.  
------------------------------------ 
Approximate location Table 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
Once recognized, films of ‘national cultural interest’ were then referred to the Committee for 
Cinema Credit, which made decisions upon the loan-worthiness of their producer(s) and the 
maximum loan to which they were entitled.4 In financial terms, productions recognized as “films of 
national cultural interest” could take advantage of the Participation Fund (Fondo di Intervento), 
assisted by the Guarantee Fund (Fondo di Garanzia). The Guarantee Fund was established to 
support the costs of films of national cultural interest, and its capital endowment comprised the 
contributions allocated by the State to the industry. The sum of money not spent by the Guarantee 
Fund were added – through six-month adjustments – to the Participation Fund, thus serving as a 
reserve for future financial needs. Through this system the State guaranteed 70 per cent of any 
finance granted, which producers were not required to pay back. A distinct category of this loan 
guarantee scheme catered for those films of ‘national cultural interest’ that were the first or second 
works of Italian directors.5
2 Ministerial Decree dated 13th February 2009, Article 1.   
3 Decree no.26, dated 14th January 1994 
4 The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) served as the Trustee Bank in the film subsidy allocation process 
5 The regulatory basis of first and second works is set out in Law no. 1213, dated 4th November 1965, article 28, 
amended in Law no. 153, dated 1st March 1994, Article 8.   
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By contrast, ‘nationally produced films’ were not submitted for assessment to the Advisory 
Committee for Cinema. Rather, such films were able to benefit from cut-rate credit facilities up to a 
value of €3,200,000 (subsequently raised in 2004 to a range between €3.5 and €5 million). 
However, unlike films of ‘national cultural interest’, ‘nationally produced films’ could not take 
shelter under the umbrella of the Guarantee Fund, meaning that the State did not underwrite the 
loan and the producer was required to repay any loan in full. Table 2 outlines the different 
categories of films presently supported by the Italian State and the extent of support given. 
------------------------------------- 
Approximate location Table 2 here 
------------------------------------- 
Thus, in this study, the label of subsidy is given to those loans granted to films of ‘national cultural 
interest’ and ‘first and second works’, which did not require repaying, while ‘nationally produced 
films’, although able to access cut-rate credit facilities, are formally categorized as non-subsidized 
films, since State support had to be repaid. Short films are not included in this analysis. Since 
‘national cultural interest’ is a much more subjective requirement than ‘national production’, 
dispute arises about the possible biases and unfair procedures behind the assessment given by the 
Advisory Committee for Cinema.  
An overview of annual public aid to the Italian film industry in the period 1995 to 2003 is presented 
in Table 3. The first column of the table lists the share of FUS appropriation given to the cinema 
industry, while the remaining columns show actual expenditure on film production and its 
breakdown into the three constituent groups just discussed. For example in 2002, in addition to 
€55.5 million assigned to the Cinema from the FUS, a further €21.8 million was added through 
different ministerial decrees to Cinecittà Holding, The National School of Cinema, and the Venice 
Film Festival (La Biennale di Venezia, Settore Cinema – Mostra Internazionale d'Arte 
Cinematografica di Venezia). Further, in November 2002 the Ministry of Cultural Heritage freed 
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previous ‘idle’ funds, directing €78.5 million to the Participation Fund to endorse film production. 
As a result, the actual available funds to Cinema in 2002 were €155.8 million, of which 
€131,944,692 was spent on production.  
Aggregating the data for the nine years, €680.1 million were assigned to 445 films that took 
advantage of the Guarantee Fund  (column [A] + [C] Total, Table 3) – comprising 357 films of 
‘national cultural interest’, which were supported by € 607.1 million in loans; and 88 ‘first and 
second works’, supported by €73 million loans. The 131 ‘nationally produced films’, which  could 
not draw upon the Guarantee Fund, obtained loans totalling €136.2 million. Thus, in the nine years 
examined, 83.3 per cent of public resources were given to productions that were not bound to make 
repayments to the State (€680.1 million out of €816.3 million): 74.4 per cent to films of ‘national 
cultural interest’, and 8.9 per cent to ‘first and second works’. Only 16.7 per cent of these loan 
facilities went to films that did not have their finances to some extent guaranteed by the State.  
------------------------------------- 
Approximate location Table 3 here 
------------------------------------- 
Data and analytical approach 
During the nine years 1995-2003, 914 Italian films were released into the Italian theatrical market 
(Cinecittà Observatory, 2007). Reliable economic and financial data are only available for films 
produced up to 2003, with incomplete information for those produced after that year, or with 
consistent information limited to an extremely restricted number of observations. The extension of 
the dataset after 2003 could have introduced some persistent biases and hence for the purposes of 
this analysis it was decided to restrict scrutiny to the nine-year time horizon from 1995 to 2003. 
While 914 Italian films were actually produced over this nine year period, the raw data revealed 
considerable missing data cell entries rendering the raw data in total unusable for generating robust 
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financial analyses. Primarily this was due to the lack of consistent financial information about the 
production of every individual film. Such missing data might well have been incidental and in some 
cases deliberate. It could be considered as potentially ‘masking’ further problems in the subsidy 
allocation process and film performances. For some observations the information in the computer 
files was indeed highly compromised or incomplete. Supplementary hard copy documentation 
offering useful data on some individual productions was also examined to help address these 
concerns. Ultimately, the final dataset includes only those film titles whose essential data – costs, 
box office takings and film producer information – are complete and reliable in financial terms. The 
truncated dataset thus likely provides a more flattering picture of the subsidy and allocation process 
than had the full population of data been available. 
As such the presented results illuminating the extremely poor performance of subsidized films can 
actually be considered a rather conservative view of film subsidy efficiency in Italy.  The dataset 
created comprises cost and revenue information for the sample of 566 films, 135 of which were 
films of ‘national cultural interest’ and received loans guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund.  The data 
were provided by the Osservatorio di Cinecittà, which serves as the centre for collection, analysis 
and diffusion of economic, qualitative and personnel information on the Italian film industry.6
Cinecittà obtained the data about box office revenues and production cost from the Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro.   
A measure of profitability is derived by deducting production costs from box-office revenues, and 
the rate of return is obtained by expressing this as a percentage of production costs. Thus, these 
measures of performance do not contain distribution and promotion costs. Nor do they reflect 
further downstream revenue flows from DVD rental and sales and television sales.7 However, given 
6 Cinecittà Holding is the operating branch of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, with the mission to promote Italian 
Cinema to increase its visibility and opportunities in Italy and worldwide. The Osservatorio di Cinecittà (Cinecittà 
Centre for Film and Audiovisual Information’s Observatory) came about as a result of the 28/2004 law for reform of the 
Italian film industry.  
7 See Sedgwick and Pokorny (2010) for a methodology for estimating profits using estimates of distribution costs and 
non-theatrical revenue streams. 
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that the focus of this paper is on the relative performance of subsidized films with the purpose of 
establishing how effective the State subsidy has been, these limitations are not critical.8
Results
Tables 4 and 5 describe the data and set out the main results.  Table 4 presents a profitability 
analysis of the 135 subsidized films, while Table 5 does this for the 431 non-subsidized films. 
------------------------------------- 
Approximate location Table 4 here 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------- 
Approximate location Table 5 here 
------------------------------------- 
From Table 4 it is clear that although public subsidy attenuates the financial exposure taken by 
producers, the collective failure of the subsidized films at the box-office means that the subsidy fell 
far short of assuring them positive returns on their investments. For the 135 films of ‘national 
cultural interest’, the Italian State contributed over 40 per cent of their production costs.  These 
films generated an average revenue of €442,041 at the box-office, attracting a subsidy twice that of 
€969,847, while average production costs were over €2,240,000. As indicated earlier, but worth 
repeating, only three of the 135 films covered their production costs without the subsidy, while 
another 14 did so as a result of the subsidy.9
The relationship between revenues and subsidy is further examined by simple bivariate OLS 
regression of revenues on subsidies. The outcome is a statistically significant positive coefficient 
8 The Euro has been in force in countries belonging to the Economic and Monetary Union since 1st January 2002. 
Accordingly, a large part of the costs and revenues of films included in the initial raw data are expressed in the pre-euro 
Italian currency unit, the lira. Therefore, all the monetary values of such films have been converted into Euros, 
according to the fixed exchange rate of 1,936.27 Italian lire for 1 euro. Economic data of some films – straddling the 
changeover when the euro came into effect – are partially expressed in Italian lire and partially in Euros in the raw data. 
9 The three films were: I Cento Passi (2000), Tano Da Morire (1997), Le Affinità Elettive (1996).
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value for the dependent variable, but with an R2 that is less than 0.1, on top of a highly positively 
skewed residual plot in which a disproportionate number of films earn revenues less than that 
predicted by the model, counterbalanced by a relatively small number of films that earn 
substantially more. Thus, there is no discernable relationship between revenues and subsidy. In 
contrast, a better fitting model is obtained by simply regressing production costs on subsidy, with a 
highly significant coefficient value for the dependent variable, as well as an R2 greater than 0.3, and 
a better behaved distribution of the residual error. Not surprisingly, the size of the subsidy is related 
to the size of the production budget, although other factors clearly play a part.  
Table 5, describes the performance of the 431 non-subsidized films. While on average these films 
do not generate profits, their performance in the theatrical market is considerably better than the 
subsidized films generating an average revenue of €1,861, 476, while costing €2.6 million to make 
– thus non-subsidized production costs were 16 per cent higher, but revenues over four times higher 
than the set of films that were subsidized.
Discussion  
In the light of the results shown in Tables 4 and 5, it would appear that the State subsidy given to 
the Italian film industry between 1995-2003 was not an efficient instrument for generating welfare, 
supporting the view that resources used in the production of films could have been better utilized 
elsewhere. Had the films of ‘national cultural interest’ not been subsidized very few of them indeed 
would have been made, making them, in effect, quasi-commodities. Furthermore, for the bulk of 
these films the subsidy was not sufficient to cover production costs.   
Drawing upon the cultural subsidy literature, Bagella and Becchetti identify five reasons for State 
patronage: 1) to broaden cultural options – had films of artistic merit not been made, the artistic 
scope of future filmmaking would be reduced; 2) to  redress the commercial imperative, which puts 
entertainment before cultural enrichment; 3) to foster cultural identity and national prestige; 4)  to 
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generate positive externalities for the community and businesses tied in to the film industry; and 5) 
to compensate the low productivity associated with ‘art’ films.  For these authors, the subsidy can 
be justified “provided that we refer to those movies that can be considered a form of art” (Bagella 
and Becchetti, 1999: 238). Clearly, this is a market failure argument whereby it is contended that if 
left to itself the market will under-supply films of cultural merit. Certainly, the criteria laid down in 
Table 1 privilege artistic talent in the form of director, actors, and screenplay writers, with by far the 
greatest weight (0.7) given to directors ( it is notable that film producers as a category are not 
included in the criteria).  
However, the evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5 indicates that so few paying customers went to 
see films of ‘national cultural interest’ – particularly so in 1999 and 2002 – as to render virtually 
empty any argument inferring that they contributed to the general diffusion of cultural welfare. Of 
the five reasons supporting the subsidy, only the fourth is not critically weakened by the chronic 
lack of consumer interest in the products being subsidized; although it does have a severe  moral 
hazard dimension, in that producers/directors would have known from recent history that films of 
‘national cultural interest’ rarely became films of popular interest.   
The results can be readily rationalized in the context of simple public policy thinking .The evidence 
furnished in this Italian arts context shows that budget allocation seems to serve more the fulfilment 
of needs of the bureaucratic bodies rather than the altruistic reasons for which the subsidy awarding 
panels are ostensibly commissioned. Over the period under study, the influence of the political 
dominion of Silvio Berlusconi and his extensive power on private and public media over the last 17 
years has been strong and pervasive. However, historically, Italian cinema and more generally 
culture, has been considered to be dominated by left-wing artists (Gundle, 2000). Accordingly, 
many opponents to the present system argue that the genesis of the subsidy regime has allowed left-
wing governments to sustain a film industry to circulate supportive ideas and messages. Further, it 
has also been suggested that left-leaning parties would typically highlight considerable budget 
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reductions to the Cinema when right-leaning governments were in office, playing on the need to 
preserve the “national cultural interest” that such films convey. Some have even argued that “left-
wing welfare has sunk the film industry” (Kolker, 2009; Mecucci, 2007).  
70 per cent of the score needed for a film to be recognized as of “national cultural interest” depends 
on the artistic contribution from the directors of movies – a contribution effectively deriving from a 
variety of other awards and nominations – so this is a more subjective rather than objective 
valuation. Accordingly, there is considerable scope and activity for various lobbies to operate 
behind the decision processes in prize and subsidy awarding. This is similarly often observed in 
budget allocation within other social sectors at a more generalized level and also in other 
geographical contexts (Mitra, 1999; Marshall, 2012).  
Some commentators (e.g. Gundle and Parkle 1996) do, however, acknowledge the unavoidability of 
market failure arguments. In large part this has been linked to the domination of Italian media and 
cultural industries maintained by Silvio Berlusconi and his commercial interests (Radaelli 2007; 
Downey and Koenig 2006). Such fears were exacerbated by his potential to influence these sectors 
even more profoundly after his entrance into the political arena in 1994 (Hasted, 2008). 
Consequently, for some scholars, the perceived monopoly of liberal left experts in film subsidy 
panels would be justified so that they could “make a stand” against the ruling political 
establishment and its closely linked interests in other media outlets, such as the control of the state  
television network - RAI. This is ultimately overseen by the Prime Minister, making the conflict of 
interest issue particularly acute in Berlusconi’s period of office (Hanretty, 2007).  Inevitably the 
exercise of such realpolitik may well have rendered less effective the use of film subsidy in the 
service of, for example, broader national cultural and industrial objectives. 
The institutions and conditions sustaining such political meddling seem to be accord with the theses 
advanced by Niskanen (1975) and other public policy scholars (Coyne and Leeson, 2004). 
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Irrespective of political viewpoints, the political and economic context of Italy has seemingly 
served to exacerbate bureaucratic inefficiency in this and other policy contexts. A higher subsidy 
budget has essentially offered greater power and sources of comfort to bureaucrats rather than 
serving the actual pursuit of the ‘national cultural interest’ – whatever that term actually means in 
practice. The Italian case seems to be indicative of a strengthening of the bilateral monopoly 
between bureaucrats and politicians. In large part, this is due to the exiguity of information flows 
that are available to meaningfully evaluate the actual subsidy processes. The empirical results 
presented in this study shows that, the objective of contributing to the prestige of Italian cinema 
through the subsidy allocation system is highly questionable. At the very least, re-thinking the 
system of budget allocation to the film industry, as currently configured, seems to be warranted. 
Concluding remarks
Historically, cinema and audiences have been conjoint concepts – without audiences there would 
have been no cinema. However, in the case of Italian cinema, the state subsidy between 1994 and 
2003 has seemingly had the effect of separating the two. It has supported a system of provision 
towards which consumers have been highly indifferent. Essentially subsidy served to move against 
the historical traditions of cinema. Thus, while it might be claimed by some that subsidy was 
essential to the very existence of the film industry, the results presented herein suggests that the 
subsidy regime of itself could not assure the development of the industry since production losses 
exceeded subsidy, even before distribution costs were factored in. The subsidy regime 1995-2003 
was ineffective and wasteful. An approach in which markets impose a measure of discipline on the 
support given to the film industry would surely be preferable – i.e.: product markets in which 
exhibitors screen films that audiences actually want to see, and finance markets in which investors 
are attracted to products that have a good prospect of generating positive rates of returns. Specific 
institutional and contextual elements characterizing the Italian system are contended to compound 
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the difficulties in achieving such an outcome.  To some limited extent recent reforms of the subsidy 
regime have begun to address the issues raised in this study, by creating a system in which both the 
State and producers share the revenue stream generated by subsidised films on the basis of their 
respective contributions to costs. In so doing it has started to require the case for subsidies to be 
much more rigorous from a film production business viewpoint10 but the existential rationale for 
such subsidies seems to remain politically unquestioned, at least for the time being. 
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Table 1 Relative weights given to various criteria used in assessing whether films are of ‘national cultural interest’
Source: Ministerial Decree dated 27th September 2004, Table A  
Note: The “Threshold value” refers to the minimum number of awards, nominations or other criteria previously 
received by the artistic talent associated with qualifying films. 
Ref. Code Parameter Threshold Value Score
A Director's artistic contribution 70
A1 Awards won by the director for direction or best film 1 20
A2 Contribution of films directed by the applying director to festivals, or 
nominations as award finalist for direction or best film
1 10
A3 Number of films directed by the applying director with box-office 
revenues greater than €800,000 in the last ten years
2 10
A4 Awards won for best acting by main actors of the cast selected by 
the applying director
1 20
A5 Nominations for best acting by main actors of the cast selected by 
the applying director
1 10
B Screenwriter 20
B1 Awards won by the screenwriter for screenplay 1 15
B2 Screenwriter's nominations as finalist in awards for screenplay 1 5
C Screenplay 10
C1 Screenplay drawn from a work of literature Yes 5
C2 Original screenplays Yes 5
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Table 2 Subsidy threshold for Italian film productions following the 2004/2005 Reform
Maximum percentage                           
on acceptable cost
Nationally produced films 70
Films of national cultural interest 50 3,750,000** 5,000,000*
Subsidised co-produced films*** As above
First and second works 90
Short  film distinguished by         
cultural interest****
100
Notes:
* It includes production cost, and production cost of  f irst copy, overhead expenses, distribution cost 
** Through a three-year loan. See D.M. 27 September 2004, chapter 1, section 2, paragraph 7, a) and b)
*** They refer to: 1) overall industrial cost if the Italian companies’ share: = or > 60% of production cost
                              2) industrial cost of the Italian company if Italian share: < 60%
**** Through a three-year loan. 
Maximum acceptable cost 
(values in euros)
As above
40,000
5,000,000*
1,500,000
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Table 3 State Financing of the Italian Film Industry, 1995-2003
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the nine annual official FUS reports from 1995 to 2003 to the House of 
Parliament (“Relazione al Parlamento”), Direzione Generale per il Cinema. Ministry of Cultural Heritage 
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 85,697,242 47,754,704 20,674,286 0 47,754,704 68,428,990
% on overall FUS 18.87% 40  f ilms 24  f ilms 0  f ilms 40 films 64 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 110,549,986
Overall FUS appropriation 469,975,778
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 87,810,739 41,006,667 29,128,169 0 41,006,667 70,134,836
% on overall FUS 18.87% 40  f ilms 27  f ilms 0  f ilms 40 films 67 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 112,174,438
Overall FUS appropriation 473,590,976
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 88,533,365 55,260,888 21,830,633 8,396,039 63,656,927 85,487,560
% on overall FUS 18.87% 41  f ilms 18  f ilms 14  f ilms 55 films 73 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 105,873,664
Overall FUS appropriation 408,000,950
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 92,638,010 80,163,923 16,991,431 7,139,500 87,303,423 104,294,854
% on overall FUS 18.87% 44  f ilms 16  f ilms 11  f ilms 55 films 71films
Actual available funds to Cinema 115,634,700
Overall FUS appropriation 464,811,209
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 94,292,634 75,402,707 9,761,035 6,186,637 81,589,344 91,350,379
% on overall FUS 18.87% 45  f ilms 11  f ilms 10  f ilms 55 films 66 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 109,230,634
Overall FUS appropriation 485,469,485
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 94,529,740 40,025,409 22,362,583 11,516,988 51,542,397 73,904,980
% on overall FUS 18.87% 25  f ilms 19  f ilms 13  f ilms 38 films 57 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 101,018,969
Overall FUS appropriation 500,963,192
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 99,002,721 47,227,401 6,736,147 14,238,407 61,465,808 68,201,955
% on overall FUS 18.87% 24  f ilms 6  f ilms 15  f ilms 39 films 45 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 99,002,722
Overall FUS appropriation 516,456,899
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 55,519,210 110,844,380 403,869 11,337,096 122,181,476 122,585,345
% on overall FUS 11.08% 52  f ilms 1  f ilm 11  f ilms 63 films 64 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 155,817,731
Overall FUS appropriation 512,990,000
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
FUS appropriation - Section Cinema 93,193,200 109,442,473 8,324,063 14,178,156 123,620,629 131,944,692
% on overall FUS 18.00% 46  f ilms 9  f ilms 14  f ilms 60 films 69 f ilms
Actual available funds to Cinema 170,689,144
Overall FUS appropriation 518,628,000
[A] Films of National 
Cultural Interest
[B] National Produced 
films
[C] First and second 
w orks
[A] + [C] Total [A] + [B] + [C] Total
607,128,552 136,212,216 72,992,823 680,121,375 816,333,591
357 f ilms 131 films 88 films 445 films 576 f ilms
Total 1995-2003
1995
1996
1997
1998
2003
1999
2000
2001
2002
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Table 4 Profitability analysis of the subsidized films in the Cinecittà dataset, in 1994 Euros 
 Source:  Osservatorio di Cinecittà 
Note: Rates of return calculations are exclusive of distribution and promotion costs 
Table 5 Profitability analysis of the non-subsidized films, in 1994 Euros. 
   Source:  Osservatorio di Cinecittà 
   Note: Rates of return calculations are exclusive of distribution and promotion costs 
Year Subsidised 
Films
Total Box off ice 
Revenues
Mean 
Revenues
Total Production 
Cost
Public subsidy % of costs 
subsidized
Net                                      
Production Cost
 Mean Rate of 
Return, excluding 
subsidy
Mean Rate of 
Return, including 
subsidy
1995 13 5,744,793 441,907 29,854,799  10,711,066 35.9% 19,143,733 -80.8% -70.0%
1996 18 6,198,865 344,381 29,682,059  14,352,994 48.4% 15,329,065 -79.1% -59.6%
1997 13 5,565,301 428,100 21,085,495  8,934,311 42.4% 12,151,184 -73.6% -54.2%
1998 11 9,899,387 899,944 33,628,855  16,071,228 47.8% 17,557,627 -70.6% -43.6%
1999 17 3,686,625 216,860 35,939,660  14,905,518 41.5% 21,034,142 -89.7% -82.5%
2000 10 5,227,105 522,711 18,522,111  10,859,926 58.6% 7,662,185 -71.8% -31.8%
2001 21 9,877,491 470,357 54,797,227  19,668,615 35.9% 35,128,612 -82.0% -71.9%
2002 13 1,616,991 124,384 19,647,866  8,996,861 45.8% 10,651,005 -91.8% -84.8%
2003 19 10,090,803 531,095 50,379,694  22,549,458 44.8% 27,830,236 -80.0% -63.7%
Total 135 57,907,361 293,537,766 127,049,977 43.3% 166,487,789 -80.3% -65.2%
Year Non Subsidized 
Films
Total Box off ice 
Revenues 
Mean Revenues Total Production Cost Mean Rate of Return 
1995 41 76,655,785 1,869,653 79,093,699 -3.1%
1996 38 101,632,814 2,674,548 99,797,168 1.8%
1997 53 147,409,949 2,781,320 110,955,908 32.9%
1998 48 98,137,329 2,044,528 118,009,493 -16.8%
1999 58 66,535,406 1,147,162 168,448,585 -60.5%
2000 40 59,374,934 1,484,373 79,982,476 -25.8%
2001 51 84,087,760 1,648,780 125,259,164 -32.9%
2002 55 101,339,175 1,842,530 206,938,975 -51.0%
2003 47 74,568,721 1,586,569 141,187,601 -47.2%
Total 431 809,741,873 1,129,673,069 -28.3%
